The iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in societies of deterministic players  by de la Peña, J.A. & Tello, N.
Discrete Mathematics 309 (2009) 4982–4991
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Discrete Mathematics
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/disc
The iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in societies of deterministic players
J.A. de la Peña a,∗, N. Tello b
a Instituto de Matemáticas, UNAM. Cd. Universitaria, México 04510 D.F., Mexico
b Escuela Nacional de Trabajo Social, UNAM. Cd. Universitaria, México 04510 D.F., Mexico
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 14 April 2005
Received in revised form 27 February 2009
Accepted 27 February 2009
Available online 5 April 2009
Keywords:
Prisoner’s Dilemma
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Successful societies
Weakly positive quadratic forms
a b s t r a c t
Two players engaged in the Prisoner’s Dilemma have to choose between cooperation and
defection, the pay-off of the players is determined by a weight w = (T , R, P, S). For
deterministic strategies p1, . . . , pn we consider a society S = S(ui : pi | i = 1, . . . , n)
formed by u =∑ni=1 ui individuals playing at random the IPDwithweightw.We introduce
the concept of a w-successful society as one where all individuals have eventually a non-
negative pay-off. We discuss success of individuals and societies by means of quadratic
forms associated to the pay-off matrix of the given set of strategies.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Since its formulation in 1950, the Prisoner’s Dilemma has become the leading metaphor to investigate rationales for
cooperation (see [1,4,7] for extensive literature lists). Two players engaged in the Prisoner’s Dilemma have to choose
between cooperation and defection. The players confront each other indefinitely often, receiving in each round R points
if they both cooperate and P points if they both defect; moreover, a defector exploiting a cooperator receives T points, while
the cooperator receives only S points. It is assumed that T > R > 0 > P > S and 0 > T + S, the last condition implying that
it is not worth for a player to cooperate and defect alternatively while the coplayer is cooperating. A tuplew = (T , R, P, S)
satisfying the above conditions is called an admissible weight.
The iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) offers rich possibilities for ingenious strategies. Most of the literature on the topic
deals only with stochastic strategies (see for example [7,8]). A deterministic strategy p = ({a0, a1, . . . , an}, f0, f1, s) is given
by a finite set {a0, a1, . . . , an} of states, where a0 is a distinguished initial state; f0 and f1 are transition functions of the states
and s is the outcome function assigning 0 or 1 to each state, where 1 stands for cooperating and 0 for defecting. Hence a
deterministic strategy is a finite automaton (see [2]).
Deterministic strategies may be depicted as finite oriented valued digraphs, as in the following examples, where→
indicates the initial state and the values of s are written on the vertices. Strategy TFT is the famous tit-for-tat strategy:
cooperate in the first round, then do whatever the other did last time. Since the well-known Axelrod’s tournaments [1], tit-
for-tat has been considered the major paradigm of altruistic behaviour [4,5]. Strategy PAV (for Pavlov) was introduced by
Nowak and Sigmund [9] and shown to outperformTFT in computer runned simulations of heterogeneous sets of probabilistic
strategies. Our computer programs show that the intolerant strategy I0 outperforms all deterministic strategies with two
states and I1 outperforms all deterministic strategies with at most three states.
∗ Corresponding author.
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Let p1, . . . , pn be deterministic strategies and consider a society S = S(ui : pi|i = 1, . . . , n) formed by u = ∑ni=1 ui
individuals playing at random the IPD with admissible weight w (i.e. in each round, two individuals are chosen randomly
to play the next step of the corresponding IPD, each individual recalling their last play against one another and responding
accordingly), among them, 0 < ui individuals use strategy pi. We shall assume that there is an unlimited number of rounds,
all occurring with probability one. (For certain considerations of the IPD it is assumed, see [1], that the next round happens
with probability w < 1. The limiting case w = 1 is usually of great interest, see [8] for a discussion). Many interesting
problems arise from the consideration of the terminal pay-off gS(x) = limt→∞ g(t)(x)t of an individual x in the society S,
where g(t)(x) is the pay-off accumulated by x in the first t rounds. Observe that, for the sake of simplicity, we omit the
dependence on the parameterw, but we may write g(w)S (x) for gS(x) if we want to stress the parameterw of the IPD.
In Section 2, we show that in case the individual x uses strategy pi, then
gS(x) = 2u(u+ 1)
[
(ui − 1)g(pi: pi)+
∑
i6=j
ujg(pi : pj)
]
,
where g(pi : pj) is the terminal pay-off of pi relative to pj. We shall consider the pay-off matrix of the society S as the
n × n-matrix G = (g(pi : pj)) (we write G(w) = (g(w)(pi : pj)) in case we want to make explicit the parameter
w. According to Maynard Smith [6], a strategy is evolutionary stable if an infinite homogeneous population adopting it
(i.e. n = 1 and S = S(u1: p1), for u1  0) cannot be invaded by mutants. We generalize the concept and say that a society
S = S(ui: pi|i = 1, . . . , n) is stable if any individual of S performs, at the long run, better keeping its strategy than changing
to a new one. In Section 3 we prove that for a set p1, . . . , pn of retaliatory strategies with g(pi : pj) ≥ 0 (1 ≤ i, j ≤ n), any
society S(ui : pi|i = 1, . . . , n) is stable. We recall that a strategy p = ({a0, a1, . . . , an}, f0, f1, s) is retaliatory if s(f0(a)) = 0
for any state a. This result generalizes the observation in [1] that TFT is an ESS.
We shall say that a society S = S(ui: pi|i = 1 . . . , n) is w-successful if for any individual x of S we have g(w)S (x) ≥ 0. It
will be easy to show that S is w-successful if and only if G(w)u ≥ (g(w)(pi : pi) : i = 1, . . . , n) =: g(w) as column vectors.
This gives conditions on the matrix G(w) for the existence of vectors u with all entries ui > 0, (i = 1, . . . , n) such that
S(ui : pi|i = 1, . . . , n) is w-successful. We shall say that S is w-macro-successful if∑x∈S g(w)S (x) = ∑ni=1 uig(w)S (xi) ≥ 0,
for any selection of individuals xi with strategy pi (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Clearly, an individual x is w-successful in the society S if at
the long run its pay-off increases. In the same way, the society S is w-macro-successful if the total pay-off (the sum of the
pay-offs of its ‘citizens’) eventually increases.
In Section 4, we introduce the quadratic form q(w)(p1,...,pn)(X1, . . . , Xn) associated with the symmetric matrix
1
2 (G
(w) +
(G(w))t) and show that S(ui : pi|i = 1, . . . , n) isw-macro-successful if and only if q(w)(p1,...,pn)(u1, . . . , un) ≥ (u1, . . . , un)tg(w).
Finally, S(ui : pi|i = 1, . . . , n) is w-macro-successful for any choice of numbers u1, . . . , un with big enough u = ∑ni=1 ui
if and only if the quadratic form q(w)(p1,...,pn)(X1, . . . , Xn) is weakly positive, that is q
(w)
(p1,...,pn)
(v1, . . . , vn) > 0 for any vector
0 6= (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Nn. We give conditions on the matrix 12 (G(w) + (G(w))t) characterizing the weak positivity of
q(w)(p1,...,pn)(X1, . . . , Xn).
Clearly, the concepts of success for individuals in a society S or that of successful societies depend on the chosen
parameters T , R, P and S. The relativity of the concepts stresses the fact that the pay-off of strategies playing the IPD depend
as much on the structure of the strategies themselves as on the setting of the game. Observe the particular role played by
0 in the definitions: an individual playing the strategy p against an individual playing the strategy p′ isw-successful (in this
game) if and only if the pay-off g(w)(p : p′) ≥ 0. For further remarks see Section 5.
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2. Deterministic strategies
2.1
Recall that a deterministic strategy p is a tuple ({a0, a1, . . . , an}, f0, f1, s) where {a0, a1, . . . , an} is a finite set of states,
with a0 a distinguished initial state, f0 : {a0, a1, . . . , an} −→ {a0, a1, . . . , an} and f1 : {a0, a1, . . . , an} −→ {a0, a1, . . . , an}
are transition functions of the states and s{a0, a1, . . . , an} −→ {0, 1} the outcome function.
Given two deterministic strategies
p = ({a0, . . . , an}, f0, f1, s)
and p′ = ({b0, . . . , bm}, f ′0, f ′1, t),
define the tournament t(p : p′) as an oriented graph with jth vertex
xj = a′j : b′j, where a′j is a state of p, b′j is a state of p′
with a′0 = a0, b′0 = b0 and arrows
xj = a′j : b′j
αj−→ xj+1 = ft(b′j)(a′j) : f ′s(a′j)(b
′
j).
We identify αj with s(a′j) : t(b′j). In other words, t(p : p′) is the orbit of (a0, b0) under the function
f × f ′: {a0, . . . , an} × {b0, . . . , bm} → {a0, . . . , an} × {b0, . . . , bm}
where (f × f ′)(ai, bj) = (ft(bj)(ai), f ′s(ai)(bj)). Therefore t(p : p′) has the shape
with q ≤ nm. It is clear that
lim
t→∞
1
t
g(t)(p : p′) = 1c(p : p′)
q∑
i=r
g(αi) =: g(p : p′) for c(p : p′) = q− r + 1
is the terminal pay-off of p relative to p′, where g(t)(p : p′) =∑ti=0 g(αi) and gi(p : p′) = g(αi) is the pay-off of p relative to
p′ at the ith step of the IPD (where g(1 : 1) = R, g(0 : 0) = P , g(0 : 1) = T and g(1 : 0) = S) and c(p : p′) is the length of
the cycle in the orbit. For examples see Section 5.
2.2
Let S be a society with u individuals. Society S plays random IPD as follows: consider two different individuals x and y, x
playing with strategy p and y playing with strategy p′. At round t , the couple (x, y)may not be confronted, then the pay-off
gt(x : y) = 0. In case x and y are confronted for the jth time, then the tournament t(p : p′) yields the arrow
a′j−1 : b′j−1
αj−1−→ a′j : b′j
and therefore gt(x : y) = gj(p : p′). That is, each player keeps track of past play against all individual players.
Lemma. The expected value gt(x : y) is
gt(x : y) = 1u
(
1− 1
u
)t−1 [ t∑
k=1
(
t − 1
k− 1
)(
1
u− 1
)k−1
gk(p : p′)
]
where u = 12u(u− 1).
Proof. Let p(t, k) be the probability to select the couple (x, y) at the round t for the kth time. Out of ut possible selections
of couples, couple (x, y) is selected k times, the other t − k times any of the remaining u− 1 couples is selected. Then
p(t, k) = 1
ut
(
t − 1
k− 1
)
(u− 1)t−k.
Hence, gt(x : y) =∑tk=1 p(t, k)gk(p : p′) = 1ut ∑tk=1 ( t−1k−1) (u− 1)t−kgk(p : p′), which is the desired expression. 
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2.3
There is an interesting consequence of (2.2): an individual x with strategy ({a0, . . . , an}, f0, f1, s) may profit for a long
while from a confident homogeneous society S acting with strategy p′ = ({b0, . . . , bm}, g0, g1, s′) if s(a0) = 0, s′(b0) = 1
and S is large enough. More precisely, let u be the number of individuals in S.
Lemma. We have g(t)(x : y) ≥ 0 as long as t ≤ ln
(
1− TS
) [ln u− ln(u− 1)]−1 + 1.
Proof. By hypothesis g1(p : p′) = T and clearly, gi(p : p′) ≥ S for i ≥ 2. Then
g(t)(x : y) ≥
(
1− 1
u
)t [ T
u− 1 + S
t∑
k=2
(
t − 1
k− 1
)
(u− 1)−k
]
=
(
1− 1
u
)t { T
u− 1 +
S
u− 1
[(
u
u− 1
)t−1
− 1
]}
.
Therefore g(t)(x : y) ≥ 0 if and only if
(
u
u−1
)t−1 ≤ 1− TS . 
For a numerical example, consider T = 2, S = −3, for u 0, ln u− ln(u− 1) ≈ 1u , then g(t)(x : y) > 0 for t ≤ 0.51 u.
2.4
The next Proposition only expresses the fact that, after a preperiod, all the confrontations between individuals enter in a
tournament-cycle determined by their strategies.
Proposition. Let S = S(ui : pi|i = 1, . . . , n) and x be an individual of S with strategy pi. Let u = ∑nj=1 uj be the total
population of S. Then
gS(x) = lim
t→∞
g(t)(x)
t
= 1
u
[
(ui − 1)g(pi : pi)+
∑
j6=i
ujg(pi : pj)
]
.
Proof. Let xj be an individual of S with strategy pj. Then
gS(x) = (ui − 1) lim
s→∞
g(s)(x : xi)
s
+
∑
j6=i
uj lim
s→∞
g(s)(x : xj)
s
if all limits exist.
Recall that
g(s)(x : xj) =
s∑
t=1
gt(x : xj) and gt(x : xj) = 1ut
t∑
k=1
(
t − 1
k− 1
)
(u− 1)t−kgk(pi : pj).
Moreover gk0+kc+m(pi : pj) = gk0+m(pi : pj), for c the length of the tournament-cycle, c = c(pi : pj) > m ≥ 0 and k0 the
length of the preperiod in the tournament t(p : p′).
Consider |gk(pi : pj)| ≤ γ for k = 1, . . . , k0 and
c(t, k0) =
k0∑
k=1
(
t − 1
k− 1
)
(u− 1)t−k, d(t, k0) =
t∑
k=k0+1
(
t − 1
k− 1
)
(u− 1)t−k,
c(t, k0) =
k0∑
k=1
(
t − 1
k− 1
)(
1
u− 1
)k−1
, d(t, k0) =
t∑
k=k0+1
(
t − 1
k− 1
)(
1
u− 1
)k−1
,
hence c(t, k0) =
(
1
u−1
)t−1
c(t, k0), d(t, k0) =
(
1
u−1
)t−1
d(t, k0).
Therefore∣∣∣∣1s g(s)(x : xj)
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣1s
s∑
t=1
gt(x : xj)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ γs
s∑
t=1
1
u
(
1− 1
u
)t−1
[c(t, k0)+ d(t, k0)] = γu ,
and limt→∞ c(t,k0)d(t,k0) = limt→∞
c(t,k0)
d(t,k0)
= 0.
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Hence
lim
s→∞
1
s
g(s)(x : xj) = 1u lims→∞
1
s
s∑
t=1
(
1− 1
u
)t−1 ( t∑
k=k0
(
t − 1
k− 1
)(
1
u− 1
)k−1
gk(pi : pj)
)
= 1
u
lim
s→∞
1
s
s∑
t=1
(
1− 1
u
)t−1 [ c−1∑
`=0
{ ∑
k=k0+rc+m
(
t − 1
k− 1
)(
1
u− 1
)k−1}
gk0+`(pi : pj)
]
= 1
u
lim
s→∞
1
s
s∑
t=1
(
1− 1
u
)t−1 1
c
(
1+ 1
u− 1
)t−1 ( c−1∑
`=0
gk0+`(pi : pj)
)
= g(pi : pj)
u
.
The proof is complete. 
3. Stability
3.1
Letw = (T , R, P, S) be an admissible weight. In the next sections it will be of importance to make explicit the parameter
w. Let p1, . . . , pn be deterministic strategies. A society S = S(ui : pi|i = 1, . . . , n) is said to be be w-stable if for every
individual x in S using strategy pi and any other strategy p0 defining a society S′ = S(1 : p0; u1 : p1; . . . ; ui − 1 : pi :
. . . ; un : pn) we have g(w)S′ (x′) ≤ g(w)S (x), for the individual x′ in S′ with strategy p0. This translates to the condition: for
every strategy p0, we have
(ui − 1)g(w)(p0 : pi)+
∑
j6=i
ujg(w)(p0 : pj) ≤ (ui − 1)g(w)(pi : pi)+
∑
j6=i
ujg(w)(pi : pj).
In the case of a homogeneous society (n = 1), this is equivalent to
g(w)(p0 : p1) ≤ g(w)(p1 : p1)
which is a condition in the limit of ESS as defined in [6].
3.2
We recall that a strategy p = ({a0, a1, . . . , an}, f0, f1, s) is nice if s(a0) = 1 and s(f1(aj)) = 1, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n; p is retaliatory
if s(f0(aj)) = 0, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. We shall say that p isw-self-supportive if g(w)(p : p) > 0.
Lemma. Let p, p′ be two strategies. Then
(i) Always g(w)(p : p) ≤ R. If p is nice, then g(w)(p : p) = R and hence p isw-self-supportive.
(ii) If p and p′ are retaliatory, then either g(w)(p : p′) = R or g(w)(p : p′) ≤ 0.
(iii) If p is retaliatory, then p isw-self-supportive if and only if g(w)(p : p) = R.
Proof. (i) The cycle in t(p : p) has a arrows of the form 1 : 1 and b of the form 0 : 0. Then g(w)(p : p) = aR+bPa+b ≤ aRa+b ≤ R. If
the strategy p is nice, when paired with itself, it will cooperate indefinitely, resulting in the average pay-off of R.
(ii) The cycle in t(p : p′) has a arrows of the form 1 : 1, b of the form 0 : 0, c of the form 0 : 1 and d of the form 1 : 0. Then
g(w)(p : p′) = aR+bP+cT+dSa+b+c+d . If both p and p′ are retaliatory, then b > 0 implies that a = c = d = 0 and g(w)(p : p′) < 0. If
c > 0, then c = d and a = b = 0, implying that g(w)(p : p′) = T+S2 < 0. Indeed, in this case, the tournament-cycle has an
arrow corresponding to the outcome 0 : 1 which implies that 0 : 0 is not a possible outcome, by the first considered case.
Then after 0 : 1, the second player retaliates and only 1 : 0 is a possible outcome. This repeats over to show that there are
the same number of 0 : 1 outcomes as 1 : 0 outcomes in the cycle, or c = d. Similarly, if d > 0, then b = d and a = c = 0
and g(w)(p : p′) = P+S2 < 0.
(iii) follows from (i) and (ii). 
Proposition 3.3. Let p1, . . . , pn be retaliatory strategies such that g(w0)(pi : pj) ≥ 0, for any 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and some admissible
weight w0.
Then S(ui : pi|i = 1, . . . , n) isw-stable for any admissible weight w and any vector u ∈ Nn.
Proof. By 3.2, for any admissible weight w = (T , R, P, S), we have g(w)(pi : pj) = R, for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, and for any other
strategy p0, we have g(w)(p0 : pi) ≤ R. Then
(ui − 1)g(w)(p0 : pi)+
∑
j6=i
ujg(w)(p0 : pj) ≤
[
(ui − 1)+
∑
j6=i
uj
]
R
= (ui − 1)g(w)(pi : pi)+
∑
j6=i
ujg(w)(pi : pj). 
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4. Successful societies
4.1
Let w = (T , R, P, S) be an admissible weight. Let p1, . . . , pn be deterministic strategies and G(w) = (g(w)(pi : pj)) the
terminal pay-off n× n-matrix.
Let S = S(ui : pi|i = 1, . . . , n) be a society corresponding to the given strategies. Then an individual x in S is said to be
w-successful in the society S if the terminal pay-off g(w)S (x) ≥ 0. If x uses the strategy pi, this is equivalent to
(G(w)u)i ≥ g(w)(pi : pi),
where u is the column vector with ith entry ui, that is, the individual x gets a higher pay-off from being part of the society S
than if it were to form a society with individuals playing the same strategy pi.
Proposition. The society S = S(ui : pi|i = 1, . . . , n) isw-successful if and only if
G(w)u ≥ g(w)
where g(w) is the column vector whose ith entry is g(w)(pi : pi). 
4.2
Consider the vector space V = Rn. A cone K in V is a closed subset satisfying: (i) 0 ∈ K , (ii) for v ∈ K and λ ≥ 0, then
λv ∈ K , (iii) if v, v′ ∈ K , then v+v′ ∈ K . The cone K is said to be proper if K ∩ (−K) = {0} and is said to be solid if it contains
a basis of V .
The set V+ of vectors vwith non-negative coordinates is a solid proper cone in V . Given a linear transformation A: V → V
and a cone K ⊂ V , the image A(K) and the preimage A−1(K) are cones. The interior V 0 of V+ is formed by those v ∈ V+
such that vi > 0 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we write 0 v for v ∈ V 0.
Theorem. Let p1, . . . , pn be deterministic w-self-supportive strategies and G(w) = (g(w)(pi : pj)) be the terminal pay-off matrix.
The following are equivalent:
(a) There exists a society S(ui : pi|i = 1, . . . , n) which isw-successful.
(b) There exists a vector 0 u ∈ Rn such that G(w)u 0.
(c) (G(w))−1(V+) ∩ V+ is a solid cone.
Proof. (a)⇒ (b): If S(ui : pi|i = 1, . . . , n) is w-successful, then G(w)u ≥ g(w)  0 because all pi are self-supportive
strategies. For the converse, observe that by continuity, we may assume that 0  u ∈ Qn and G(w)u  0. Then for some
natural numberm, we get 0 v := mu ∈ Nn and G(w)v = mG(w)u ≥ g(w).
(b)⇒ (c): Clearly, (G(w))−1(V+)∩V+ is a cone and there is a number ε > 0 such that for any vector v ∈ Rn, ‖v−u‖ < ε,
then v  0 and G(w)v  0. Then the ball Bε(u) ⊂ (G(w))−1(V+) ∩ V+ and the cone (G(w))−1(V+) ∩ V+ is solid. The
implication (c)⇒ (b) is clear. 
4.3
Let p1, . . . , pn be deterministic strategies. Consider the symmetric matrix A(w)(p1, . . . , pn) := 12 (G(w) + (G(w))t) and
q(w)(p1,...,pn)(X1, . . . , Xn) =
n∑
i=1
g(w)(pi : pi)X2i +
∑
i<j
(g(w)(pi : pj)+ g(w)(pj : pi))XiXj
the associated quadratic form.
Recall from the Introduction that the society S = S(ui : pi|i = 1, . . . , n) is w-macro-successful if∑x∈S g(w)S (x) =∑n
i=1 uig
(w)
S (xi) ≥ 0, for any selection of individuals xi using the strategy pi (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Obviously aw-successful society is
w-macro-successful.
Corollary. Let p1, . . . , pn be strategies and let S = S(ui : pi|i = 1, . . . , n) be a society. Then S is w-macro-successful if and
only if q(w)(p1,...,pn)(u1, . . . , un) ≥ utg(w). Moreover, this number is positive if all strategies p1, . . . , pn arew-self-supportive.
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Proof. Let xi be an individual in S using strategy pi. Observe that∑
x∈S
g(w)S (x) =
n∑
i=1
uig
(w)
S (xi)
=
n∑
i=1
ui(ui − 1)g(w)(pi : pi)+
∑
i<j
uiuj[g(w)(pi : pj)+ g(w)(pj : pi)]
= q(w)(p1,...,pn)(u1, . . . , un)− utg(w).
The claim follows. 
4.4
Weshall say that the deterministic strategies p1, . . . , pn arew-compatible if for vectors (u1, . . . , un) ∈ Nnwith big enough
u =∑ni=1 ui we get societies S(ui : pi|i = 1, . . . , n) which are w-macro-successful. We characterize compatible strategies
by properties of the associated quadratic form q(w)(p1,...,pn)(X1, . . . , Xn) and then by simple properties of the symmetric matrix
A(w)(p1, . . . , pn).
Theorem. Let p1, . . . , pn be deterministic strategies. Then the following are equivalent:
(a) p1, . . . , pn arew-compatible.
(b) q(w)(p1,...,pn)(X1, . . . , Xn) is weakly positive, i.e. for every vector 0 6= v ∈ Rn with non-negative coordinates we have
q(w)(p1,...,pn)(v) > 0.
Proof. (a)⇒ (b): Assume p1, . . . , pn arew-compatible and let 0 6= v ∈ Nn. Considerm ∈ N such thatw := mv has∑ni=1wi
big enough. Then S(wi : pi|i = 1, . . . , n) isw-macro-successful and by 4.3,
0 < q(w)(p1,...,pn)(w) = m2q
(w)
(p1,...,pn)
(v) and 0 < q(w)(p1,...,pn)(v).
(b) ⇒ (a): Consider the compact set C = {v ∈ Rn: 0 ≤ v and ‖v‖ = 1}. The hypothesis implies that the form
q(w)(p1,...,pn)(X1, . . . , Xn) reaches a minimum γ > 0 in C and the linear form
∑n
i=1 g(w)(pi : pi)Xi reaches a maximum δ. Then
for any vector u = (u1, . . . , un)t ∈ Nn with
q(w)(p1,...,pn)(u) < u
tg(w),
we have
γ ‖u‖2 ≤ q(w)(p1,...,pn)
(
u
‖u‖
)
‖u‖2 = q(w)(p1,...,pn)(u) < utg(w) = ‖u‖
(
ut
‖u‖
)
g(w) ≤ ‖u‖δ.
Therefore ‖u‖ ≤ δ/γ and only finitely many vectors u ∈ Nn may have this property. Therefore for∑ni=1 ui  0 we have
q(w)(p1,...,pn)(u) ≥ utg(w), that is, S(ui : pi|i = 1, . . . , n) isw-macro-successful. 
4.5
There are good criteria to decide whether or not the quadratic form q(x) = xtAx, associated to a symmetric n× nmatrix
A, is weakly positive. The following is a simple generalization of a result by Zel’dich [10] (see also [3]).
Proposition. Let A be a symmetric matrix and q(x) = xtAx the associated quadratic form. The following are equivalent:
(a) q(x) is weakly positive.
(b) For every principal submatrix B = A
(
i1...is
i1...is
)
of A, either det B > 0 or the adjoint matrix ad(B) is not positive (that is, it has
an entry≤ 0).
Proof. (a)⇒ (b): Let B be a principal submatrix of A. Suppose that ad(B) is positive. By Perron theorem, ad(B)v = ρv for a
vector 0 6= v ≥ 0 and the spectral radius ρ > 0. Then 0 < q(v) = vtBv = ρ−1vtB ad(B)v = ρ−1 det Bvtv and det B > 0.
(b)⇒ (a):We show that q(x) is weakly positive by induction on n. Since property (b) is inherited to principal submatrices,
we get that the restriction q(i) associated to the principal submatrix A(i,i) is weakly positive, i = 1, . . . , n.
Assume that q is not weakly positive. Then there is a vector 0 w with q(w) ≤ 0.
We claim that q(i) is positive for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Otherwise, q(i)(x) ≤ 0 for some vector 0 6= x ∈ Rn−1. Since q(i) is weakly
positive, then xa > 0 and xb < 0 for indices a, b. We may consider y ∈ Rn with yj = xj for j 6= i and yi = 0.
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We find two points w + λ1y and w + λ2y in the boundary ∂V+ of the positive cone V+ in Rn. Hence the parabola
q(w + λy) = q(w)+ λwtAy+ λ2q(y) takes values> 0 (resp.≤ 0,> 0) in λ = λ1 (resp. λ = 0, λ = λ2). Hence q(w + λy)
takes positive values for λ ≥ λ2. Therefore 0 < q(y) = q(i)(x) ≤ 0, a contradiction proving the claim.
In particular, every proper principal submatrix B of A has det B > 0. Since A is not positive, det A ≤ 0. By hypothesis,
ad(B) is not positive. Assume that the jth row v of ad(A) is not positive. Choose λ ≥ 0 such that 0 ≤ λw + v lies on ∂V+.
Hence
0 < q(λw + v) = λ2q(w)+ λwtAv + q(v) ≤ λ(det A)wj + (det A)vj
≤ (det A)(det A(j,j)) ≤ 0,
since by the claim q(j) is positive. This contradiction completes the proof of the result. 
5. Dependence on the admissible weights
5.1
In this section we shall discuss in which way the former results depend on the fixed admissible weightwwith which the
IPD is played. The discussion is motivated by remarks of a referee of the paper.
Let w = (T , R, P, S) satisfying be an admissible weight. Given p and p′ two deterministic strategies, we denote by
g(w)(p : p′) the relative pay-off of p playing the IPD with initial conditionsw against p′.
Lemma. The set of admissible parametersw ∈ R4 satisfying g(w)(p : p′) ≥ 0 together with the origin 0 form a cone C(p : p′) in
R4. Moreover:
(i) The cone C(p : p′) is either 0 or a solid cone.
(ii) If C(p : p′) = 0 then for any admissible tuple w we get g(w)(p : p′) ≤ g(w)(p′ : p), that is, the pay-off of an individual
playing the strategy p is lower than the pay-off of another playing the strategy p′, independently of the initial conditions.
(iii) If C(p : p′) is a solid cone then the point u = (1, 1, 0,−1) belongs to the topological closure of C(p : p′).
Proof. Observe that for w, w′ admissible parameters and r > 0 we get admissible parameters w + w′ and rw such that
g(w+w′)(p : p′) = g(w)(p : p′)+ g(w′)(p : p′) and g(rw)(p : p′) = rg(w)(p : p′). Hence C(p : p′) is a cone.
Let a (resp. b, c and d) be the number of arrows in the tournament-cycle of t(p : p′)with outcome 1 : 1 (resp. 0 : 0, 0 : 1
and 1 : 0). Then forw = (T , R, P, S)we have g(w)(p:p′)=aR+bP+cT+dSa+b+c+d .
(i) Assume that C(p : p′) is not trivial and let 0 6= w = (T , R, P, S) ∈ C(p : p′). Then T > R > 0 > P > S. If both a = 0
and c = 0, then also b = 0 = d. Therefore C(p : p′) = R4. Assume that a > 0 then, by slightly modifying R, we get a point
w′ ∈ C(p : p′) such that g(w′)(p : p′) > 0. We do not lose generality assuming that w = w′. Then there are small values
r > 0 such that any E ∈ R4 with norm |E| < r satisfies a(R + E1) + b(P + E2) + c(T + E3) + d(S + E4) > 0, that is the
sphere with centerw and radius r lies in C(p : p′). Therefore C(p : p′) is a solid cone.
(ii) With the notation above, C(p : p′) = 0 implies a = 0 = c. Then for any admissible w we get g(w)(p′ : p) = bP+dTb+d ≥
bP+dS
b+d = g(w)(p : p′).
(iii) Let 0 6= w = (T , R, P, S) ∈ C(p : p′). As in (i) we may assume that g(w)(p : p′) > 0. Then 0 < aR + bP +
cT + dS ≤ (a + c)T + dS ≤ [−(a + c) + d]S, which implies that a + c > d. There is a sequence of admissible tuples
wn = (1+ 1n , 1+ 1n , 1n ,−1+ 1n ), for n big enough, with g(wn)(p : p′) > 0. 
5.2
Let p = (p1, . . . , pn) be a sequence of strategies. We introduce an equivalence relation ∼p in the set of all admissible
weights in the following way: for w = (T , R, P, S) and w′ = (T ′, R′, P ′, S ′) admissible weights we write w∼pw′ if for any
couple 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n the inequality g(w)(pi : pj) > 0 (resp. = 0, < 0) happens exactly when g(w′)(pi : pj) > 0 (resp.
= 0, < 0) holds. Observe that this means that w and w′ belong to the same sequence of half-spaces in R4 determined by
the hyperplanes Hi,j defined by the linear equation ai,jR+ bi,jP + ci,jT + di,jS = 0, where ai,j (resp. bi,j, ci,j, di,j) denotes the
number of the tournament-cycle of t(pi : pj)with outcome 1 : 1 (resp. 0 : 0, 0 : 1, 1 : 0).
Proposition. There is only a finite number of ∼p-equivalence classes of admissible weights. For each equivalence class C the
topological closure C in R4 is a convex cone. The cone C is solid if and only if C is an open set.
Proof. The complement inR4 of the union of all hyperplanes Hi,j, for pairs 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, is formed by a finite number of open
subsets U1, . . . ,Us. For any i = 1, . . . , s, two points in the open set Ui are∼p-equivalent. The other equivalence classes are
the different walls of the topological closures of the Ui, for i = 1, . . . , s.
Clearly, if C is an equivalence class, then its closure satisfies: (i) 0 ∈ C; (ii) for v ∈ C and λ ≥ 0, then λv ∈ C and (iii) if
v, v′ ∈ C , then v + v′ ∈ C . If C is open, it clearly contains a basis of R4 and C is solid. For the converse, observe that if C is
solid, then there is an open ball Br(x) contained in C . Then C = Ui for some 1 ≤ i ≤ s. 
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Any ∼p-equivalence class whose topological closure contains the (non-admissible) weight (1, 1,−1,−1) is called a
canonical class.
Corollary. There is a canonical class which is open. If w is an admissibleweight in a canonical class, then for any pair 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n,
the inequality g(w)(pi : pj) ≥ 0 implies that ai,j + bi,j ≥ ci,j + di,j in the tournament-cycle of t(pi : pj).
Proof. Observe that the points (1+λ1, 1−λ2,−1+λ3,−1−λ4)with 0 < λ1 < λ2 < λ3 < λ4 < 1 form a set of admissible
weights that cannot be contained in a finite set of non-solid cones. Hence some of these weights lie in a canonical class. The
second claim follows by continuity. 
5.3
Let again p = (p1, . . . , pn) be a sequence of strategies and consider a society S = S(ui : pi|i = 1, . . . , n). Let xi be
an individual in S playing the strategy pi, for i = 1, . . . , n. As above, define ∼(S,i) be the equivalence relation in the set
of admissible weights such that w∼(S,i)w′ if both xi is w-successful and w′-successful in the society S. By the arguments
in 5.2, there are finitely many∼(S,i)-equivalence classes Ci,1, . . . , Ci,si of admissible weights. Consider a set C of admissible
weights of the form ∩ni=1 Ci,ti , for some 1 ≤ t1 ≤ s1, . . . , 1 ≤ tn ≤ sn, then two weights w,w′ in C satisfy the following
properties:
(a) Let x be an individual in S, then x isw-successful in S if and only if it isw′-successful in S. Denote by ES(w) the set of
indices i such that an individual x playing the strategy pi isw-successful. Hence ES(w) = ES(w′).
(b) The society S isw-successful if and only if it isw′-successful. In that case ES(w) = {1, . . . , n}.
(c) Moreover, the topological closure C of C in R4 is a cone.
Corollary. There is a finite partition C1, . . . , Cm of the admissible weights such that the following holds:
(i) the closure C i of each Ci is a convex cone;
(ii) for any two admissible weightsw,w′, ES(w) = ES(w′) if and only if w andw′ belong to the same set Ci for some i.
6. Examples
6.1
For the next examples we fix values T = 2, R = 1, P = −1, S = −3. Consider p the strategy tit-for-tat and p′ the strategy
given by the digraph
/ 0
1

0

1
0

1
-
0
0
Y
1
V
•
1:0

t(p : p′) •
0:0
•
0:1
 •
1:0
`
The tournament t(p : p′) is indicated above. The pay-off matrix G is
G =
 1 −12
−1
2
1
 .
Then G
(
x
y
)
≥
(
1
1
)
is satisfied when
x ≥ 1
2
y+ 1 ≥ 1
2
[
1
2
x+ 1
]
+ 1 = 1
4
x+ 3
2
.
For example, a society S(x : p, y : p′)with x = y ≥ 2 is successful, while S(x : p, 2x : p′) is not successful.
The associated quadratic form is
q(x, y) = x2 − xy+ y2 =
(
x− 1
2
y
)2
+ 3
4
y2
which is positive. Then a society S(x : p, y : p′)with x+ y 0 is macro-successful (that is, p and p′ are compatible).
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6.2
Consider p the strategy PAV and p′ the strategy given by the digraph
/ 0
1

0

1
0

1
q
0
0
L
1
R
•
1:0

t(p : p′) •
0:1
•
0:0
 •
1:0
`
With the values of T , R, P and S as in 6.1, the pay-off matrix G is
G =
1 − 521
2
1
 .
Then G−1V+ ∩ V+ = {(x, y): x ≥ 52 y ≥ 0}. For example, S(3y : p, y : p′), with y ≥ 2, is a successful society.
The associated quadratic form is
q(x, y) = x2 − 2xy+ y2 = (x− y)2
which is not weakly positive. Therefore p and p′ are not compatible.
6.3
Consider p the intolerant strategy I0 and p′ = ({b0, b1, . . . , bm}, f0, f1, s) any strategy. Observe that in case αi = 1 : 0
in the tournament t(p : p′), then αj = 0 : εj for some εj ∈ {0, 1} and any j ≥ i + 1. Then g(p : p′) = bP+cTb+c and
g(p′ : p) = bP+cSb+c for some b, c ≥ 0 and b+ c = c(p : p′). With the assignment of parameters given in 6.1, g(p : p′) = −b+2cb+c
and g(p′ : p) = −b−3cb+c . Otherwise, all αi = 1 : 1 (i ≥ 1) and g(p : p′) = g(p′ : p) = R = 1. In the first case, the associated
quadratic form is
q(x, y) = x2 − 2b+ c
b+ c xy+ g(p
′ : p′)y2
which is weakly positive if and only if g(p′ : p′) = 1 and b = 0. In conclusion, given a self-supportive strategy p′, the
strategies p and p′ are compatible if either g(p : p′) = 1 = g(p′ : p) and then any society S(x : p, y : p′) is successful or if
g(p : p′) = 2, g(p′ : p) = −3 and g(p′ : p′) = 1 and then, only societies S(x : p, y : p′)with y ≥ 3x+ 1 are successful.
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